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1. FURTHER REF TELCON. FOLLOWING ARE QUESTIONS SUPPLIED BY CND GROUP, ANSWERS TO WHICH COULD BE GIVEN AT PROPOSED HOUSE OF COMMONS MEETING JULY 18. APPRECIATE SOONEST REPLY BY AIRMAIL ATTENTION ROSENFELD TO MEET ABOVE DEADLINE:

A. DOES EITHER SIDE GAIN ANY MILITARY ADVANTAGE OVER THE OTHER AS A RESULT OF THE SALT ACCORDS?

B. THE ABM TREATY IMPLICITLY ACCEPTS THAT SUCCESSFUL ABMS WOULD DESTABILIZE THE PRESENT BALANCE OF DETERRENCE. WOULD IT NOT HAVE BEEN MORE LOGICAL THEREFORE TO CONCLUDE A 'ZERO-ABM' AGREEMENT? WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR RENEGOTIATION TO GET A 'ZERO-ABM' AGREEMENT?

C. IT HAS BEEN CLAIMED THAT THE ABM SYSTEM WHICH PROECTS THE ICBM LAUNCHING AREA IS A STABILIZING INFLUENCE SINCE IT SHIELDS THE 'DETTERENT'. IF THIS IS VALID, WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR DISMANTLING ALL OTHER ICBMS AND LIQUIDATING FOREIGN MILITARY BASIS?

(1)

D. WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR NOT INCLUDING MULTI-WARHEADS IN THE AGREEMENTS? IS THERE AN INSPECTION DIFFICULTY IN THIS INSTANCE? IF SO, DOES THE DIFFICULTY ONLY EXIST AT THE DEPLOYMENT STAGE---. SURELY A BAN ON MIRV TESTING WOULD BE EASY TO MONITOR?

E. HAS MIRV ANY ADVANTAGE OVER MRV CONSIDERED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF DETERRENCE? IS NOT MIRV INTENDED PRIMARILY FOR PINPOINT

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ATTACKS ON MILITARY TARGETS - I.E. A 'FIRST-STRIKE' STRATEGY?

F. IF IT IS TRUE THAT THE RECENT ACCORDS LEAVE BOTH SIDES WITH A DETERRENT CAPABILITY, WHY NOT HAVE AN ALL-ROUND MORATORIUM ON ALL FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS?

G. DO YOU THINK THAT THE RECENT AGREEMENTS FULFILL THE NUCLEAR POWERS' OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NPT TO "PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH ON EFFECTIVE MEASURES RELATING TO THE CESSATION OF THE ARMS RACE AND TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT." IN WHAT SENSE DOES THE AGREEMENT HALT THE ARMS RACE? WHERE IS THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT?

H. COULD NOT THE PROVISIONS ON VERIFICATION BE EQUALLY WELL APPLIED TO OTHER TREATIES -- FOR EXAMPLE, NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES, A COMPREHENSIVE TEST-BAN TREATY (IN CONJUNCTION WITH SCISMIC DETECTION)?

I. IN VIEW OF THE POTENTIAL FOR DESTABILIZATION FROM ASW, WHY NOT A MORATORIUM ON THIS DEVELOPMENT?

J. IN VIEW OF THE SOVIET STATEMENT REGARDING 'OFFENSIVE' WEAPONS OF NATO ALLIES, WOULD THE US PLEDGE NOT TO HELP BRITAIN ACQUIRE AN ADDITIONAL POLARIS SUBMARINE? WHAT WOULD THE SOVIET ATTITUDE BE TO SUCH A DEVELOPMENT?

K. WHAT ARE THE US AND SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE INSTALLATION OF POSEIDON MISSILES ON UK NUCLEAR SUBMARINES?

L. IN VIEW OF THE PLANS BY THE US TO CONTINUE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 6,000-MILE-RANGE TRIDENT SUBMARINE WHAT ARE THE LONG-TERM VIEWS OF THE US REGARDING THE HOLY LOCH BASE? IS THERE ANY INTENTION TO DEPLOY NUCLEAR BOMBERS FROM THE UK?
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